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IS THE REHNQUIST COURT AN 
"ACTIVIST" COURT? 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES 
RANDY E. BARNETT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Lopez,l the Supreme Court, for the first 
time in sixty years, declared an act of Congress 
unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded its powers 
under the Commerce Clause. In 2000, the Court reaffirmed the 
stance it took in Lopez in the case of United States v. Morrison,2 
once again finding that Congress had exceeded its powers. Are 
these examples of something properly called "judicial 
activism"? To answer this question, we must clarify the 
meaning of the term "judicial activism." With this meaning in 
hand, I examine the Court's Commerce Clause cases. The 
answer I give to the question of whether the Rehnquist Court is 
an "activist" court is "no."3 
I. THE MEANING OF "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM" 
With one exception, I have consciously avoided, either in 
print or conversation, criticizing a judge or court for its 
"activism."4 My hesitation stems from a belief that this term, 
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law, 
<rbarnett@bu.edu> This paper was prepared for Conservative Judicial Activism, 
a Conference sponsored by The Byron R. White Center for the Study of American 
Constitutional Law and the University of Colorado Law Review. (Oct. 19-20, 
2001). I thank Frank Goodman for his very helpful suggestions on an earlier 
draft. 
1. 514 U.s. 549 (1995). 
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
3. By "no" I mean "yes." While the Court is highly activist according to the 
definition I shall provide in Part I, I contend that it is less activist in precisely 
those cases for which it has been most criticized-in particular, its Commerce 
Clause cases. 
4. The exception was Randy E. Barnett, Left Tells Right: "Heads I Win, Tails 
You Lose," WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at A26, reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE 
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while clearly pejorative, is generally empty. It is empty 
whether used by New Dealers to criticize the Progressive Era 
Supreme Court, modern conservatives to criticize the Warren 
Court, or more recently by those on the left to criticize the 
Rehnquist Court. When a decision is deemed to be "activist" 
this usually means only that a court has struck down a statute 
or reversed a criminal conviction-or in the case of Bush v. 
Gore5 reversed a state supreme court decision-and the person 
using the term disagrees with the outcome. In other words, 
"activism" usually refers to an action taken by a court of which 
the speaker disapproves. By the same token, the term usually 
employed as the opposite of activism-"judicial restraint"-is 
similarly short on content. 
Though some use this rhetoric to imply that a court is 
acting in an activist fashion whenever it strikes down an act of 
a legislature, almost no one really believes this is always 
improper. If pressed, I could think of only one academic (who 
shall remain nameless) who contends that courts should never, 
or almost never, strike down unconstitutional laws. Surely no 
one in this Symposium believes this. Though we may often 
disagree over whether a particular statute is constitutional, we 
all share the conviction that the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts should strike down or nullify unconstitutional 
laws enacted by legislative majorities. Therefore, if something 
called "judicial activism" is a bad thing, this cannot be what the 
term means. 
Rather than take the time to survey all the possible 
meanings of "judicial activism"-and assuming you do not wish 
to abandon the term entirely as I would favor-let me offer and 
then defend my own definition: When speaking of 
constitutional adjudication, it is activist for courts to adopt 
doctrines that contradict the text of the Constitution either to 
uphold or nullify a law.6 In sum, it is activist for courts to 
substitute for the relevant constitutional provision another 
provision that they think, for whatever reason, is preferable. 
According to this definition, it is not judicial activism to strike 
COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 264 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol, eds., 
2001) (criticizing the Florida Supreme Court for its "activism" in Bush v. Gore 
using the same definition described below). 
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
6. It might also be "activist" to go beyond nullifYing unconstitutional laws to 
command that other branches of government perform their duties in certain ways 
and not in others, but I shall not pursue this possibility here. 
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down 'a statute that violates the text of the Constitution. To 
the contrary, it would be activist to do nothing in the face of 
legislation that runs afoul of the written Constitution. 
I believe that most people, including most participants in 
this Symposium, would accept this definition of judicial 
activism upon reflection. Most everyone thinks courts should 
find a statute unconstitutional when it contradicts what the 
Constitution says. Where disagreements would, should, and do 
arise is over what the Constitution (or statute) actually 
requires; and part of this 'disagreement is over how the 
meaning of the Constitution should be determined. 
I am of the view that the courts and Congress should 
respect the original meaning of the Constitution where that 
meaning can be determined.7 I also think that, when the 
meaning is vague or where the text authorizes 
supplementation, as it does for example in the Ninth 
AmendmentS and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,9 there is room for discretionary 
choices and a need for judges to formulate constitutional 
doctrines to put these clauses into effect. 
This method of interpretation is called "Original Meaning 
Originalism" and is to be distinguished from "Original Intent 
Originalism." Whereas Original Meaning Originalism looks to 
the public meaning that terms and phrases had at the time of 
the term's enactment, Original Intent Originalism seeks to 
understand the intentions of those who wrote or ratified the 
text to fill any gaps in the original public meaning at the time 
of enactment. While advocating an Original Intent Originalism 
is a perfectly respectable ,position, it is not the theory of 
interpretation espoused today by most thoughtful libertarians 
or conservatives. When pressed, most would say they seek 
original meaning, not original ihtent.lo Here, I will confine my 
7. I defend this approach in Randy E. Barnett, An Original ism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). The next few paragraphs are based 
on the analysis presented at greater length there. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . . .  "). 
10. Cf ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA'ITER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAw 17 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997) ("We look for a sort of 'objectified' 
intent - the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, 
place alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.") 
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use of the term originalism to a method that seeks and relies 
upon the original public meaning of the text, not the original 
intent of its framers or ratifiers. 
Even those who do not consider themselves originalists 
seem drawn to original meaning, as exemplified by the recent 
controversy over what constitutes an "impeachable offense." 
Liberals and conservatives, academics and public 
commentators alike, all began with, and placed great stock in, 
the original meaning of the term "high crimes and 
misdemeanors" and then attempted to apply that meaning to 
the conduct in questionY The same holds true of those who 
debate the meaning of the Second Amendment's "right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms."12 And many academics who 
purport to reject originalism think that the original meaning of 
a constitutional term or passage should serve as a starting 
point or at least an important factor in establishing the 
meaning of the Constitution's text. 13 
The inherent attraction of original meaning flows, I 
believe, from the insight that where the Constitution speaks, 
judges are not empowered to change its meaning. As was 
contended by Isaac Penington, Jr. in 1651: "They who are to 
govern by Laws should have little or no hand in making the 
Laws they are to govern by."14 The whole reason to have a 
written constitution, like a written contract, is to "lock in" some 
meaning that can only be changed by proper procedures. 
Otherwise, why bother? The object of a written constitution is 
to bind Congress or judges. Were these agents empowered to 
change its meaning to something they like better, the point of 
having a written constitution would be lost. 
That the meaning of a written constitution must remain 
the same until it is properly changed is the essence of 
originalism. We should follow the original meaning of the text, 
then, not because we are bound by the "dead hand" of the past, 
11. For an extended discussion of the current popularity of Original 
Meaning Originalism, even among ostensibly nonoriginalists, see Barnett, supra 
note 7, at 611-20. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
13. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 (1991) 
(referring to the "historical modality" of constitutional argument). 
14. ISAAC PENINGTON, JR., THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, SAFETY AND LIBERTY 
OF THE PEOPLE 3 (London, 1651), as it appears in EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RIGHTS OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA 84 (1988). 
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or by our dead ancestors, or in my case by other people's dead 
ancestors. We should adhere to the original meaning 
because-right here, right now-we are committed to a written 
constitution, and the whole reason for putting a constitution in 
writing is to constrain the behavior of political and judicial 
actors. If those actors can change its meaning as they desire 
and in the absence of a written amendment, the written 
constitution will have failed in its principal purpose, and our 
commitment to it rings hollow. 
Also hollow would be the claim that persons should obey 
Congress or the courts because their actions were authorized or 
mandated by the Constitution. Judges claim that their rulings 
are not just their opinions, but come from an independent 
source called "the Constitution." If, however, the Constitution 
means whatever Congress or the courts want it to mean, then 
this is a lie. A more accurate statement would be "Obey 
because WE tell you to," and such a statement is unlikely to be 
well-received by the public. 
On the other hand, where the text is either vague or 
deliberately incomplete, there is room for judicial construction 
that does not contradict the original meaning. Even where the 
original meaning of a term or passage can be discovered it must 
still be applied to a particular case or controversy and the 
process of application will require choice and judgment. 
Though this makes originalism considerably less confining 
than its critics assume, the existence of vagueness and the 
need for judgment does not eliminate the duty to adhere to and 
apply original meaning in good faith to the extent it can be 
determined. 
When considering whether you agree or disagree with 
Original Meaning Originalism, I suggest you think not of the 
clause of the Constitution you dislike and would like to see 
changed but of the one you most cherish and do not want to see 
others change. Do not think of the clause that impedes your 
ability to accomplish what you think is in the public good; 
think of the clause that stops others from doing bad things that 
they think are in the public interest. In the absence of a 
constitutional amendment, do you really want judges with 
whom you disagree to be able to change the meaning of your 
favorite clause to something they like better? How do you 
argue when your favorite clause is threatened or violated by 
those who do not like it? 
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In sum, for an Original Meaning-or "moderate"15-
originalist, it is not activist (if one insists on using that term) 
for a court to strike down legislation that violates the original 
meaning of the text. To the contrary, it would be activist to 
disregard that meaning and uphold a statute where it conflicts 
with the text of the Constitution because a judge, for some 
reason, prefers the statute to the original meaning of the 
Constitution. By the same token, it would not be activist for a 
court to adopt doctrines to identify what constitutes "cruel and 
unusual punishment" or an "excessive fine."16 Nor would it be 
"activist" for a court to protect from legislative infringement an 
unenumerated right that, as the Ninth Amendment affirms, is 
"retained by the people." On the contrary, it would be activist 
for the Court to ignore the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment simply because it is vague, or to 
contradict the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment and 
"deny or disparage" a right simply because a particular right 
was not included in the enumeration. 
According to this view of "judicial activism," whether or not 
a court is being activist depends not at all on whether it is 
upholding or striking down legislation. Instead, it depends on 
whether the court is enforcing or refusing to enforce the text of 
the Constitution as properly interpreted. And proper 
constitutional interpretation, I further maintain, means 
finding and applying in good faith its original meaning. 
This suggests two distinct factors that determine whether 
a particular decision should be deemed activist: (1) Does the 
result of a given case contradict the text of the Constitution as 
properly interpreted (regardless of how the court reached that 
result)? (2) Did the court try to identify and stay within the 
original meaning of the text (regardless of the result that was 
reached)? A decision whose result is consistent with original 
meaning is less activist than one that contradicts it. And a 
decision in which a court in good faith seeks the original 
meaning is less activist than one that deliberately ignores that 
meaning. With respect to the first of these considerations, we 
cannot conclude that a court is being activist until we 
15. C{. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 231 (1980) ("Moderate originalism is a perfectly sensible 
strategy of constitutional decision making."). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
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determine the original meaning of the text that a particular 
statute either has or has· not violated. We cannot assess the 
first type of activism, therefore, without evaluating the 
substance of the relevant constitutional text. 
Many who use the term "activist" do so, it seems, in order 
to criticize a court without having to advance their own view of 
the correct interpretation of the constitutional text at issue, but 
this is a cheat. Unless one abandons judicial review entirely, 
one simply cannot know whether a court is being activist 
unless one also knows what that text means. The epithet of 
"activism" provides no escape from the need to take a stance on 
how the critic thinks the Constitution should be interpreted. 
By what method should its meaning be found and what 
meaning does the critic attach to whatever particular passage 
is at issue? 
Upon examination, I conclude that, while the Rehnquist 
court may indeed be an activist court in its method, the results 
it has reached are less activist than those of previous courts in 
precisely those cases where its activism is now being 
criticized-most especially in its Commerce Clause decisions. 
Any such assessment, however, requires an inquiry into the 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause. 
II. ARE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES "ACTIVIST"? 
This brings us back. to the Lopez and Morrison cases. 
Whether the Court was being activist in striking down the Gun 
Free School Zones Act or a portion 'of the Violence Against 
Women Act depends entirely on whether those acts exceeded 
the powers of Congress under the' Commerce Clause as 
properly interpreted. Because I think they did, I do not believe 
the Court was acting in an activist fashion in those two cases. 
As the courts have always recognized, the text of the 
Constitution does not grant Congress a general "police power" 
to pass any legislation it may deem to be in the public interest. 
Instead, the Constitution confines Congress to its enumerated 
powers and allows it to execute those powers by means of laws 
that are "necessary and proper."17 In the landmark case of 
17. See Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745 
(1997) (distinguishing between Madisonian and Marshallian conceptions of 
"necessity"). In a new book, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (Princeton Univ. Press, forthcoming 2003) (on file with 
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Marbury u. Madison,18 Chief Justice Marshall stated this 
proposition as well as it can be stated: 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and 
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
constitution is written. To what purpose are powers 
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a 
government with limited and unlimited powers, is 
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on 
whom they are imposed .19 
Later, in McCulloch u. Maryland,20 Marshall reaffirmed 
the proposition that: "This government is acknowledged by all 
to be one of enumerated powers."21 In that same opinion, he 
also wrote: ''We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of 
the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be 
transcended."22 To the extent that readers accept Marshall's 
proposition, they cannot claim it is activist for courts to restrict 
Congress to its enumerated powers and to nullify any law that 
exceeds those powers. 
The next question to be addressed, then, is the meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, which Congress claimed as its source of 
power in both Lopez and Morrison. Notice that the 
Constitution does not grant Congress the power over all 
the author) (hereinafter RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION), I will be qualifying 
somewhat the historical claim I made there by showing how Madison's (and 
others') conception of "necessity" was closer-though by no means identical-to 
that of Hamilton (and Marshall) than is commonly believed. For now, see David 
P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional 
Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 932 (1982) (discussing John Marshall's 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland and concluding that, "[iJn light of earlier 
statements in his opinion, the implication seems unmistakable; incidental 
authority must not be so broadly construed as to subvert the basic principle that 
Congress has limited powers."). 
18. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
19. [d. at 176. By quoting from Chief Justice Marshall here and elsewhere, 
I do not mean to endorse all of what he says about either the Commerce Clause or 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Nor do I consider his opinions reliable sources 
of original meaning. I cite them as evidence that even in the most expansionist 
cases from this era-cases still alleged to support expansive federal powers­
Marshall adamantly insists that the powers granted Congress under these clauses 
are necessarily limited. 
20. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
21. [d. at 405. 
22. [d. at 421. 
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commerce. Instead, it granted Congress the power "to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes."23 The only reason to list these 
three specific powers over commerce Was to exclude some 
commerce from the purview of Congress-and it turns out that 
the only commerce that is excluded is commerce that occurs 
wholly within a particular state. As Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden,24 the most famous of all Commerce 
Clause cases: 
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; 
and that something, if we regard the language or the subject 
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce 
of a State ... The completely internal commerce of a State, 
then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.25 
Protecting wholly intrastate commerce from the reach of 
Congress is a constitutional imperative in our federal system. 
Indeed, if Article I had included the power to regulate wholly 
intrastate commerce, it would simply have read "Congress 
shall have power to regulate commerce." The only reason for 
the tripartite breakdown specified was to exclude the power to 
regulate wholly intrastate commerce. To the extent that the 
activities sought to be regulated by Congress in these two 
statutes-possessing guns within 1000 feet of a school or 
committing the crime of rape-are wholly intrastate activities, 
they are outside the reach of Congress whether or not they are 
commerce. But were these acts "commerce"? 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate 
"commerce," not to regulate other activities-but what does 
"commerce" mean? The historical evidence is overwhelming 
that, at the time it was enacted, "commerce" referred to the 
buying, selling, bartering or transporting of goods. I recently 
surveyed every use of the term "commerce" in the records of the 
Constitutional Convention, the state ratification conventions, 
and The Federalist Papers.26 While I found many examples of 
the term "commerce" being used to refer to the exchange or 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
24. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
25. [d. at 195. Once again, this is not meant neither to endorse the rest of 
Marshall's analysis of the clause in Gibbons nor as evidence of original meaning. 
26. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001). 
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transportation of goods, I did not find a single example of the 
word being used unambiguously in any broader sense. Instead, 
"commerce" or trade was routinely distinguished from such 
productive activities as agriculture and manufacturing.27 
These findings were strongly confirmed by a new survey of 
every use of the term "commerce" in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
from 1728 until 1800.28 Like the evidence I reported from the 
drafting and ratification process, commerce was consistently 
distinguished from productive economic activities such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. For example, a passage from 
the January 13, 1790 issue is particularly revealing: 
Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce, [alre 
acknowledged to be the three great sources of wealth in any 
state. By the first [agriculturel we are to understand not 
only tillage, but whatever regards the improvement of the 
earth; as the breeding of cattle, the raising of trees, plants, 
and all vegetables that may contribute to the real use of 
man; the opening and working of mines, whether of metals, 
stones, or mineral drugs; by the second [manufacturers], all 
the arts, manual or mechanic; by the third [commercel, the 
whole extent of navigation with foreign countries. As these 
are more or less cultivated or encouraged, the figure or 
influence of a nation will rise or fall among her neighbours; 
for as riches, in the present state of things, constitute more 
than half the character or power, the acquisition of these to 
the community must bring with it every other public 
advantage.29 
In short, at the time of the enactment of the Commerce 
Clause, the public meaning of "commerce" was the trade and 
transportation of what is produced by agriculture and 
manufacturing. 30 Moreover, nowhere was it ever used to refer 
27. See id. at 112-25. 
28. See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2002). Because no single 
quote can establish whether a usage is normal or aberrational, in my Chicago and 
Arkansas articles I have provided a comprehensive assessment of every use of the 
term in the Constitutional Convention, ratification conventions, the Federalist 
Papers and The Pennsylvania Gazette. This new survey of The Pennsylvania 
Gazette was made possible by the database provided by Accessible Archives, Inc. 
on its website, http://www.accessible.com. 
29. THE PA. GAZ., January 13, 1790. This quote appears in entry #76406 on 
Accessible Archives, supra note 28. 
30. Therefore, to the extent the Court expands the meaning of commerce to 
include all "economic" activity, it is acting in an "activist" fashion, but that 
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to a noneconomic activity. Given that Congress sought in these 
statutes to reach activities-possessing a gun within 1000 feet 
of a school or committing the crime of rape-that were not 
"commerce" under this definition, it exceeded its power under 
the Commerce Clause, and it was not "activist" for the 
Rehnquist Court to so find.31 
Though Congress exceeded its commerce power by 
attempting to regulate activities that are not commerce and 
take place wholly within a state, a further issue must be 
addressed to determine whether the Court properly found the 
statute to be unconstitutional. Can Congress reach these 
actions under the Necessary and Proper Clause that gives it 
the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution" its power to regulate 
commerce between one state and another?32 Since the 
founding, it has long been recognized that this provision could 
not have been intended to render the enumeration of powers 
redundant or superfluous. 
As then-Representative James Madison explained to the 
first Congress: "Whatever meaning this clause may have, none 
can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to 
Congress. Its meaning must, according to the natural and 
obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to means 
necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified 
powers."33 Madison then observed: "The essential characteristic 
criticism does not apply to the actual outcome of either Lopez or Morrison. 
31. As for the argument that possession of guns near schools "substantially 
affects" commerce, Congress was delegated a power over commerce among the 
states, not a power over any activity that substantially affects commerce. The 
"substantial affects" doctrine is a constitutional construction that, whatever else it 
might entail, cannot be used to undermine the enumerated powers scheme which 
it would if it extends to the activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison. As I briefly 
discuss below, it was precisely this untenable conception of substantial effects 
that the Court was trying to avoid in both cases. 
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. 
33. 2 ANNALS OF CONGo 1898 (1791). Although there came to be 
disagreement between Madison, Jefferson, and Randolph on the one hand, and 
Hamilton and Marshall on the other, about the degree of necessity that must be 
shown, all agreed that, for a measure to be "necessary," there must be a sufficient 
fit between the means chosen and the enumerated end. See McCulloch V. 
Maryland, 17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) at 421 (stating that means chosen must be "plainly 
adapted" to an enumerated end); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 97, 104 (Harry C. Syrett & Jacob Cooke eds., 1965) ("The relation 
between the measure and the end, between the nature of the mean employed 
towards the execution of a power and the object of that power, must be the 
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of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated 
powers, would be destroyed, if, instead of direct and incidental 
means, any means could be used . . . .  "34 
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court adopted two 
doctrines to avoid construing the Necessary and Proper Clause 
as a grant of unlimited power to Congress. First, it held that 
when Congress attempts to reach wholly intrastate activities, 
these activities must be economic in nature to be incident to its 
power over commerce.35 Second, Congress may reach wholly 
intrastate economic activity only if that activity was shown to 
"substantially affectD interstate commerce."36 
Of course the text of the Constitution includes neither 
doctrine and both can be criticized as much for giving too much 
power to Congress as for giving too little.37 Still, the expressed 
purpose of adopting these two doctrines was to apply the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in such a way as to maintain the 
scheme of limited and enumerated powers that John Marshall 
correctly attributed to the text while, at the same time, staying 
within the "aggregate effects" test first enunciated in Wickard 
u. Filburn.38 
In Wickard, the Court said that Congress may regulate 
wholly intrastate activities that, taken in the aggregate, 
adversely affect interstate commerce.39 In a world in which 
virtually any type of action, when aggregated, could be said to 
"affect" interstate commerce, some limiting doctrine like a 
"substantial effects test" must be established or the 
enumerated powers scheme would be completely eliminated 
and Congress would have unlimited power over all activities 
whether economic or not. Indeed the Court in Wickard itself 
repeatedly used the term "substantial" to describe the type of 
effect that an act must have to be reached by Congress: "[T]he 
reach of that power [granted by the Commerce Clause to 
Congress] extends to those intrastate activities which in a 
criterion of constitutionality . . . .  "). 
34. 2 ANNALS OF CONGo 1898 (1791). 
35. United States V. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995). 
36. Id. at 560. 
37. Once again, the original meaning of "commerce" patently did not extend 
to all economic activity. 
38. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
39. Id. at 127-28 (stating "[tlhat appellee's own contribution to the demand 
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of 
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of 
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.") 
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substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the 
granted power."40 
The need for a doctrine to limit the reach of the Commerce 
Clause, and thereby preserve the enumeration of powers, in an 
interconnected economy is nothing new. For example, while 
President, Madison wrote: "In the great system of political 
economy, having for its general object the national welfare, 
everything is related immediately or remotely to every other 
thing; and consequently, a power over any one thing, if not 
limited by some obvious and precise affinity, may amount to a 
power over every other thing."41 Despite the fact that, even at 
the time of the founding, everything was "related immediately 
or remotely to every other thing,"42 the Constitution granted 
Congress the power to regulate only "commerce" and only 
commerce "among the several states." 
In sum, adopting any construction of the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses that gives Congress unlimited 
power over anything it chooses to regulate would be the height 
of judicial activism (if we must use this term) for such a 
construction would render the list of enumerated powers 
purposeless. It would also violate the very first sentence of 
Article I, which begins, "All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .  "43 And it 
would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment which affirms that: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people."44 
40. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 
119) (emphasis added). See also id. at 125 (Appellee's activity may "be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . . ") 
(emphasis added); Id. at 128-29 ("Congress may properly have considered that 
wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of 
regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its 
purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices.") (emphasis added). On 
the reluctance of the Court deciding Wickard to completely abandon all limits on 
its judicial review of congressional power and its refusal to take such a step 
explicitly, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 212-24 (1998). 
41. Letter From James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 
LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1816-1828, at 143-44. 
42. Id. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This is not to assert a doctrine of "states' rights," 
but merely to affirm the limits of federal power. According to the Tenth 
Amendment, powers that are not in the hands of the national government are 
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The following test for any Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause doctrine would smoke out any activism 
flying under the cover of legitimate constitutional construction: 
If you cannot think of an example of an activity that Congress 
may not reach under the proposed doctrine, then it must be 
wrong.45 The Court sought to avoid just such an unlimited 
doctrine in Lopez and Morrison.46 By limiting Congress to 
regulating only that wholly intrastate activity that was (1) 
economic and (2) had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, the Court likely ceded too much power to Congress. 
In attempting to draw some such line, however, the Court was 
certainly not acting in an activist fashion. 
CONCLUSION: CONSERVATIVE VERSUS LIBERAL ACTIVISM 
In this article, I have confined myself to the charge that 
the Court has engaged in "conservative judicial activism" in its 
Commerce Clause decisions wherein it held Congress within its 
enumerated powers. In contrast, the sort of "liberal judicial 
activism" typically complained of by conservatives involves 
striking down legislation because it violates the un enumerated 
rights, privileges or immunities retained by the people. 
Rehnquist Court cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey47 
and Troxel v. Granville48 come immediately to mind. I am as 
unsympathetic to the latter charge of activism as I am to the 
former. 
either in the hands of the states or in the hands of the people. It does not specify 
which. 
45. Of course, this test does not imply the converse: that any construction of 
these clauses that has some limit is therefore necessarily acceptable. 
46. Indeed, the test is inspired by Justice Scalia's questioning in oral 
argument of Solicitor General Drew Days seeking an example of a law that would 
exceed the commerce power of Congress under the Government's construction: 
But with reference to the commerce point, realistically, that's where we 
are. None of us at least can think of anything under our present case 
law, or at least under your argument, that Congress can't do if it chooses 
under the Commerce Clause, so if the Federal system must be preserved 
by someone, and the Commerce Clause is a means by which the Federal 
structure can be obliterated, and if we have no tools or analytic 
techniques to make these distinctions, then it follows that the Federal 
balance is remitted to the political judgment of the Congress. 
Oral Argument Transcript at 18-19, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(No. 93-1260). 
47. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
48. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
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The Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are as much a part of the 
text of the Constitution as the Commerce Clause. No inkblot 
on the document prevents us from discovering their original 
meaning.49 Protecting the un enumerated liberties to which 
they refer from violation is lim essential component of a 
legitimate law-making system in which the majority is neither 
allowed to exceed its enumerated powers nor to violate the 
rights of the individua1.50 
A commitment to adhere to the original meaning of the 
entire text, not merely the parts one likes, is neither 
"conservative" nor "liberal" as these terms are used today. 
Regrettably, in my experience, many liberals and conservatives 
are quite willing to jettison those portions of the text that do 
not fit neatly within their philosophical approach, be it the 
restrictions of enumerated powers on the one. hand or 
unenumerated rights on the other. Either form of"activism"­
whether by Courts or by Congress-that conflicts with the 
original meaning of the Constitution, however, is forbidden by 
the commitment to preserve, protect, and defend a written 
constitution that constrains the power of lawmakers. 
I am not claiming that the present Supreme Court has 
never acted in an activist fashion as I have defined the term. 
As was discussed in Part I, from an originalist perspective, 
there are actually two distinct types of activism that can apply 
to judicial decisions that deviate from the text of the 
Constitution: decisions with activist results and those opinions 
49. See Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE 
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 1, 1 (Randy E. Barnett, ed. 1989) (identifying the original meaning 
of the rights "retained by the people " in the Ninth Amendment as the natural 
liberty rights that people have before a government is formed); "Implementing the 
Ninth Amendment," in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 1, 1 (Randy E. 
Barnett, ed. 1993). See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (identifying the 
original meaning of "privileges or immunities" in the Fourteenth Amendment as 
both the natural liberty rights retained by the people and additional fundamental 
written guaranties in the Bill of Rights). I shall provide additional supporting 
evidence for both of these conclusions in RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 17. 
50. I defend this conception of constitutional legitimacy in Randy E. 
Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2003). 
as well as in RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 17. A preliminary 
defense can be found in Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural 
Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93 (1995). 
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employing activist methods. The first is when the result of a 
given case contradicts the original meaning of the text. The 
second is when judges do not even try to discern the original 
meaning of the text. 
Given that the Rehnquist Court largely continues to 
adhere to the doctrines of the past sixty years, I have no doubt 
that it does engage in the first sort of activism all the time. 
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court rarely employs an originalist 
method. Even in Lopez itself, Justice Rehnquist (unlike Justice 
Thomas) did not base his decision on the original meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, choosing instead to rely on "first 
principles"51 while trying to remain consistent with New Deal 
decisions. Nevertheless, the result reached by the Court in 
Lopez and Morrison were much closer to the original meaning 
of the Commerce Clause than any case in the previous sixty 
years. The irony is that the Court is being criticized as activist 
in the few areas where its results have come closer to the 
original meaning of the text than any Supreme Court in recent 
memory-that is, where it has acted in a less activist manner. 
Of course, you are free to reject the conception of ''judicial 
activism" I am proposing and to advocate a power in Congress 
or the courts (or both) that allows them to change the meaning 
of the Constitution with the times and reach results you think 
are better. If you do, however, you have no basis to criticize the 
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause cases as "activist"-unless 
you also adopt a conception of "judicial activism" that applies 
whenever a court strikes down any law enacted by a legislature. 
But this would be a conception of ''judicial activism" that would 
call into question the entire practice of judicial review. Few 
would embrace this conception of judicial activism except 
hypocritically to criticize a Court for those decisions with which 
they disagree. 
51. 514 U.S. at 552 ("We start with first principles. The Constitution creates 
a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See art. I, § 8. AB James Madison 
wrote: 'The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.'"). On the other hand, if you apply the 
same "first principles" as held by the framers your results are highly likely to be 
consistent with the original meaning of the text they wrote. 
